This article originally appeared in the Hindustan Times on October 23, 2023.
Prague, the capital of the Czech Republic, has long been in the crosshairs of competing great powers. Once a crown jewel of the Holy Roman and AustroHungarian Empires, the city lies about 200 kilometres from Napoleon’s great victory over the combined Austrian and Russian armies at Austerlitz. In the 20th century, the city witnessed occupation and invasion by the militaries of both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during the 20th century. But until recently it would have been difficult to envision the scenic Czech capital as an epicentre of the emerging global competition between the United States and China.
Starting around 2005 and accelerating after 2014, Czech leaders including President Miloš Zeman and a succession of prime ministers, mostly affiliated with the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), made concerted efforts to engage Beijing, resulting in an increase in trade, investment, and tourism.
Chinese companies went on a corporate buying spree in this post-Communist but highly industrialised European economy. Several Confucius Institutes were established, often at private or regional universities. Czech media such as TV Barrandov and various magazines carried flattering articles about the Belt and Road Initiative. As part of what was heralded as a “golden period” in Czech ties with China, Xi Jinping himself visited in 2016, marking the first visit to Prague by a paramount Chinese leader. China, it seemed, was on the march.
Doubts about this new partnership started to creep in amid revelations of Chinese business ties translating into political influence. Several Czech cabinet ministers, including some former prime ministers, began to lobby for Chinese business, joining boards or becoming paid advisors to Chinese-owned companies. While some political leaders on the left were motivated by ideological affinities in their desire for warmer ties with Beijing, others appear to have been driven by economic pragmatism. This partially explains the Czech Republic’s initially enthusiastic participation in the 16+1 format of diplomatic engagement between some Central and Eastern European countries and China.
But after 2017, a series of small events quickly led to spiralling tensions between Prague and Beijing. In a spat over Chinese technology — following the Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency’s warning against the use of Huawei and ZTE products — the previous prime minister Andrej Babiš accused the Chinese ambassador of lying and suggested he be replaced. In 2019, Beijing cancelled a number of cultural events after the Mayor of Prague Zdenek Hřib said he would remove reference to the “One China” policy in the sister-city agreement between Prague and Beijing.
But the Czechs refused to back down. Three months after annulling the sistercity agreement with Beijing, Prague entered into a similar agreement with Taipei. Senior Czech parliamentarians visited Taiwan as part of official delegations and in June this year, the Czech President Petr Pavel shared the stage with Taiwan’s foreign minister Joseph Wu. In just a few years, in what represents a remarkable turnaround, the Czech Republic along with Lithuania have become among Taiwan’s closest partners in Europe. This month, at a conference inaugurated by the Czech president and the country’s foreign minister in Prague’s main convention centre, dissident Uyghur musicians performed alongside speeches from a host of activists from Taiwan, Tibet, and Hong Kong, all overtly opposed to the Chinese Communist Party.
There are larger strategic games being played. For the Czechs and some other central and eastern Europeans, taking a tougher line on China is also a route to solidifying an otherwise uncertain partnership with the US.
Whatever the state of Washington’s present support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the war in Ukraine, Central European leaders understand that over the longer-term the primary US focus will be competition with China in the Indo-Pacific.
Meanwhile, other European capitals are paying close heed to Beijing’s approach to the Czech Republic and Lithuania. Despite the initial rancour, China’s official statements have recently softened or been non-existent. It appears that Beijing confronts a dilemma: Making a visible and public example of smaller European countries risks undermining the charm offensive directed at Western European businesses. Instead, it would strengthen the economic security agenda being pursued by some European Commission leaders in Brussels. In sum, the consequences for the Czech Republic of standing up to China have so far been negligible. Despite all the initial sound and fury from Beijing, China appears more like a paper tiger.
Prague’s deteriorating ties with Beijing are in many ways a product of unique circumstances — Czech domestic politics, the country’s recent history with Soviet subjugation, and its security environment on the frontiers of NATO. But in the wake of Beijing’s apparent diplomatic “successes” at BRICS and the Belt and Road Forum, the Czech experience also exposes the limitations and fragility of China’s global outreach.
Dhruva Jaishankar is executive director, ORF America. The views expressed are personal.